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In May 2010, the Centre for Central Banking Studies at the
Bank of England held its seventh Chief Economists’ Workshop,
taking as its theme ‘state-of-the-art modelling for central
banks’.  The event featured three keynote academic speakers as
well as talks by participants on the macroeconomic and
financial models currently in use or being developed to meet
the various challenges faced by central banks.(2) Central to the
discussions was the question of how central banks should
respond to the potential deficiencies in their modelling
frameworks highlighted by the recent financial crisis.  This
article summarises the main points raised during the
Workshop.(3)
Economic history teaches us that crises are a common feature
of economic development.(4) Yet, when they eventually take
place, they have been often treated as surprise events or
episodes of ‘bad luck’.  Occasionally, crises do trigger a rethink
of economics, both as a discipline and for its practitioners.  For
example, after the Great Depression of the 1930s, modern
macroeconomic theory emerged, following Keynes’s work and
subsequently underpinned by the formal mathematical
framework initiated by Hicks and Samuelson.  There was also a
significant improvement in the collection of macroeconomic
data across countries, including national accounts.  These
theoretical and empirical advances allowed policymakers after
World War II to develop a workable framework for
macroeconomic policy to guide their fiscal and monetary
decisions.  
The academic challenge raised by the crisis
The recent financial crisis has already triggered debate about
the state of macroeconomics and financial economics.(5) One
of the leading commentators to predict the fallout from the
credit bubble as early as the mid-2000s was Nouriel Roubini
(Stern School of Business, New York University).  As a keynote
speaker at the Workshop, he provided a comprehensive
critique of macroeconomics.
Roubini argued that standard macroeconomic models — such
as those taught in universities — do not deal well with the
possibility of crises.(6) Most economic or financial crises result
from structural imbalances that have built up over time —
rather than a sudden and unexpected shock — meaning that
they are, to some extent, ‘predictable’ (even if the exact timing
of their unravelling is not).  But standard models are largely
based on equilibrium concepts.(7) As such they have, for
example, limited market frictions, few externalities and
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contain an overly simplified financial system with complete,
efficient markets, thereby implying no asset price bubbles.  In
addition, they do not explicitly include either political
economy constraints or principal-agent issues.  All of these
factors were important contributors to the recent financial
crisis.  Over the past two decades, significant progress has
been made to deal with each of these weaknesses.(1) But these
microeconomic or partial-equilibrium modelling advances
have been made in a piecemeal manner and are yet to be
embedded into a new, single paradigm.
Roubini emphasised that academic research should prioritise
developing macroeconomic models that are better at
modelling the complexity of the dynamics in the financial
sector, and its interactions with the real economy.  In
particular, it is important to understand better the effect of
asset price movements on financial intermediaries’ balance
sheets and their leveraging/deleveraging cycle, and ultimately
on the market’s liquidity in a macroeconomic context.(2)
The convergence of central banks’ modelling
frameworks during the Great Moderation
Prior to the recent financial crisis, there was an emerging
consensus within macroeconomic theory.  This period was
characterised by an unusually high degree of macroeconomic
stability, with most developed countries experiencing steady
output growth and low and stable inflation.  Within the
economic community, a ‘new neoclassical synthesis’ emerged,
combining the strengths of the various competing approaches
developed over previous decades.(3) This new generation of
macroeconomic models — known as dynamic stochastic
general equilibrium (DSGE) models — has become increasingly
popular as policy tools in central banks.  They are now widely
used to help assess the causes of both cyclical and structural
changes within the economy as well as to forecast the main
macroeconomic variables and the effect of monetary policy
changes.
These DSGE models contain features from a broad range of
economic thought.  They borrow from new classical models,
relying on microeconomic foundations to describe 
decision-making by agents based on their preferences and the
constraints they face.  DSGE models also include ‘New
Keynesian’ features, assuming that prices cannot costlessly
and instantaneously adjust.  This, in turn, gives a role to
monetary policy.(4) At the heart of DSGE models are the 
intertemporal choices made by agents and, hence, the role
played by expectations in determining current
macroeconomic outcomes.  These features mean that these
models are well suited to exploring the interaction between
policy actions and agents’ behaviour, something that the older
generations of macroeconomic forecasting models could not
(Lucas (1976)).(5)
Improving current policy modelling
frameworks
Before the financial crisis, DSGE models typically contained
only a very rudimentary description of the financial sector.  In
part, that was because up until then there was little evidence
that financial variables played an important role in explaining
business-cycle fluctuations.  But it also reflected more
fundamental difficulties in modelling financial system
behaviour, particularly in stressed conditions when the risk of
spillover, contagion and adverse feedback loops come to the
fore.(6) These factors mean that financial crises may have a
larger effect than crises not originating in financial markets, a
feature that is difficult to incorporate into a general
equilibrium model.(7)
The recent crisis has clearly demonstrated, however, that the
behaviour of the financial sector can have important
implications for both the real economy and monetary policy.
The macroeconomic models used in central banks ahead of the
crisis were not built to analyse or deal with a sudden
breakdown of credit markets as witnessed in late 2008, and
nor were the majority of the alternatives that were available.
Consequently, policymakers face an important challenge to
their stylised modelling framework.(8) Central banks have
been at the forefront of developing and operationalising
sophisticated versions of these models.  As a result, many
DSGE models now include one or more financial frictions.  For
example, they may incorporate a financial-accelerator
mechanism (as developed by Bernanke et al (1996)) to reflect
the role that businesses’ assets used as collateral for borrowing
can play in amplifying shocks.  Financial intermediaries have
also been introduced into a DSGE framework by incorporating
credit spreads that are affected by banks’ balance sheets.(9)
The reaction of modellers to the crisis marks an important
development in macroeconomic modelling.  In a recent paper,
Christiano et al (2010) argue that the current generation of
models is quite capable of explaining the key channels through
which monetary policy operates, for example providing a
(1) For an example of these, see Vayanos and Woolley (2008), who offer a rational theory
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(2) For instance, see Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2010) for a recent example of this
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(3) See Mankiw (2006) for a summary of the macroeconomic modelling advances since
the Great Depression.  The term ‘new neoclassical synthesis’ was coined by
Goodfriend and King (1997) to describe this consensus view.
(4) See, for example, Woodford (2003).
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(7) See International Monetary Fund (2008) for a review of past episodes of financial
stress and their implications for economic activity (Chapter 4). 
(8) See Bean (2009).
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plausible account of pricing frictions.  Further work is of course
necessary and some of the weaknesses highlighted by the crisis
can be improved upon as part of central banks’ ongoing
research programmes.
A more pluralistic approach to modelling for
monetary and financial stability? 
A single framework may not be able to incorporate the right
balance between richness and parsimony that policymakers
need to address both monetary and financial stability issues.
Some economists clearly favour more pluralism in modelling
approaches.  For instance, Solow (2008), commenting on the
state of macroeconomics, noted that his ‘general preference is
for small, transparent, tailored models, often partial
equilibrium, usually aimed at understanding some little piece
of the (macro-)economic mechanism’.  As he went on to say,
‘(o)ne of the advantages of this alternative style of research is
that it should be easier to accommodate relevant empirical
regularities derived from behavioral economics as they
become established’.(1)
This pluralistic approach is consistent with central banks’
current modelling frameworks, which typically draw on a suite
of models.  One of the effects of the crisis could be to induce a
different sort of pluralism in economic research as economists
explore new modelling techniques to complement those
already available — for instance, by borrowing tools from other
sciences or fields.  Indeed, Workshop participants suggested a
number of alternative modelling paradigms, as discussed
below.
The economy as a system of interacting agents
Some of the assumptions chosen for microeconomic
foundations of DSGE models may prevent economists from
taking into account the direct interaction between individuals.
This was explored further in a keynote session by Alan Kirman
(GREQAM, Université Aix-Marseille III).(2) In this context, the
economy can be viewed as a complex system composed of
different agents who do not necessarily follow the generally
accepted behavioural rules, such as rational behaviour.  Since
agents interact with each other both directly and indirectly,
behaviour at the aggregate level is intrinsically different from
the average behaviour of individuals.  It is difficult therefore to
embed this within a model with a typical representative agent,
such as standard DSGE models.  Instead, it is important to
understand better the network governing the interaction
between agents.  Both the structure and evolution of this
network can have significant implications for macroeconomic
performance, and the emergence of crises in particular.
This approach can be extended to other systems such as the
financial sector.  The recent crisis has shown that the financial
system was much more complex and adaptive than
economists had modelled.(3)
Some of the risks to the financial sector as a whole (or
‘systemic risk’) come from within the system, ie they are
‘endogenous’.  This contrasts with most other systems — such
as ecosystems or electrical grids — in which risk is typically
exogenous and unpredictable.  It is the role of both financial
institutions and markets to create, intermediate and manage
risks across states of the world and over time.  But in doing so,
financial companies potentially contribute to systemic risk.
Financial institutions are highly connected with each other,
both directly and indirectly, domestically and internationally.
Partly because of the complexity of these interlinkages,
financial institutions do not always take into account the
impact that their own actions might have on other financial
institutions.  The response of those institutions can in turn
create adverse feedback loops within the system.(4)
This ‘network risk’ has been particularly difficult to trace.  That
in part reflects inadequate data on the connections between
financial institutions, which in turn partly reflects the low
frequency of severe stress episodes during which those
connections are typically revealed.  But it also reflects a lack of
information on how domestic financial systems are joined
together globally.(5)
Initiatives are, however, already under way to improve our
understanding of this ‘network risk’.  Efforts are being made to
improve both the quantity and quality of data available to
market participants and authorities.  This will provide a better
snapshot of the structure of the network, making it easier to
spot potential weak points.  In addition, economists have
drawn on network techniques from other disciplines — such as
ecology or epidemiology — to understand how characteristics
of the financial network structure (such as the degree of
interconnectedness between financial institutions) can
influence the impact of shocks and how they spread.  While
this strand of work is fairly new, it typically shows that tipping
points exist at which robust systems can suddenly swing into
fragility.(6)
The challenges in quantifying systemic risk
Network models typically include limited modelling of the
behaviour of financial institutions, and in particular banks.  As
a result, they have limited ability to track or explain various
sources of risks (eg credit risk, market risk, interest income risk)
(1) The article by Solow (2008) is a response to Chari and Kehoe (2006) on how modern
macroeconomic theory has been shaping policy.
(2) See Kirman (2010).
(3) These systems are ‘complex’ in the sense that they are made up of multiple,
interconnected elements, and ‘adaptive’ because they can change and learn from
experience.  The ecosystem is an example of a complex adaptive system.  Haldane
(2009) explores what other disciplines that use models based on similar complex
networks can tell us about financial systems.
(4) For an analysis on the sources of systemic risk, see Bank of England (2009a).
(5) For more on authorities’ needs regarding data on interconnections within the financial
system, see page 46 of Bank of England (2009b).
(6) The financial sector is typically modelled as a set of nodes (representing individual
institutions) interlinked by a network of counterparty exposures.  Each node, which
represents an individual financial institution, is endowed with a very simplified
balance sheet.  See Gai and Kapadia (2010) or Haldane (2009) on financial networks.Reports State-of-the-art modelling for central banks 217
faced by banks, how they interact and how they affect the
real economy.  To complement the results of network models,
policymakers are developing suites of partial-equilibrium
models of the banking sector, which can be used to track
overall risks in the system over time or run system-wide 
stress tests to assess its resilience to specific adverse
scenarios.(1)
One of the main modelling challenges is to account for some
of the systemic feedback and contagion effects that emerged
during the crisis.  For instance, banks sought to raise their
liquidity buffers as the crisis deepened and uncertainty
increased, and this had a snowballing effect on the liquidity
available to the system as a whole.  Some recently developed
models (for example, the Bank’s Risk Assessment Model for
Systemic Institutions (RAMSI)) attempt to include several of
these feedback effects even though those are still difficult to
validate statistically.(2) In contrast to most system-wide stress
tests that were developed before the crisis, which did not
typically include systemic feedbacks, these new models can
actually generate system-wide instability.  But while these
various models have led to promising results, it is too early to
say which one(s), or which combination, could become the
central organising framework for central banks’ assessment of
systemic risk in the future.
The limits of statistics and the importance of
embedding uncertainty in central banks’
models 
New models can enhance our understanding of economic
behaviour but it is optimistic to believe that they will generate
the certainty available in other sciences.  Unfortunately, as
emphasised by Aikman et al (2010), ‘policymakers are often
expected to anticipate the unpredictable’.
In a keynote presentation, Andrew Lo (Sloan School of
Management, Massachusetts Institute of Technology) argued
that while disciplines such as physics can derive laws that
satisfactorily account for the overwhelming majority of
available evidence in the field, economics is different because
it does not rest on the same level of uncertainty.  Models of
economic systems and financial markets simply cannot be as
predictive as (most of) those in physics.
Building on Knight’s (1921) distinction between risk and
uncertainty, Lo developed a taxonomy to characterise
uncertainty levels in order to help economists understand
better the limitations of their own models.(3) Without being
able to conduct controlled experiments, verifying any
economic theory can only be approached indirectly.  This is a
major factor in what Lo termed irreducible uncertainty.  The
uncertainty faced by both economists and policymakers is, at
best, only ‘partially reducible’ given the nature of both agents’
behaviour and economic data.  Models can be constructed that
are robust in some circumstances, but they can never be
expected to explain outliers or satisfactorily account for tail
risk.  Once uncertainty has reached irreducible levels, any
model is then outside of its ‘domain of validity’.  In this
context, ‘failures’ of economic models can almost always be
attributable to a mismatch between the level of uncertainty
and the methods/econometric tools used to manage it.
There are two potential, non-mutually exclusive, responses to
this challenge.  In the medium term, policymakers’ objective is
to develop further their understanding of economic processes
and, hence, build better models to reduce uncertainty further.
But in the short run, they also have to devise strategies to
manage the risks that they believe cannot be fully modelled or
understood.  In reality, both approaches are simultaneously
applied.  Improving a model can be challenging but may be
worth the effort.  But inevitably, given the nature of
economics, there will always be uncertainty.  And any user of
models, whether an academic or a policymaker, needs to
understand the limits of what their models can be used for.
The ‘physics envy’ that economists suffer from should
ultimately help them by making them more humble about the
limitations of their own models and improving their
understanding of the uncertainties they face.
(1) By running a system-wide stress test, policymakers analyse the impact of an adverse
scenario at the level of the financial system, as opposed to analysing it at the level of
an individual institution.
(2) For more on the Bank’s RAMSI, see Aikman et al (2009).  The Oesterreichische
Nationalbank was one of the first to develop such an integrated quantitative
framework for systemic risk analysis (‘Systemic Risk Monitor’) by combining standard
models for market and credit risks with an interbank network model to account for
the possibility of default cascades.  
(3) Lo and Mueller (2010) splits uncertainty into five levels:  ‘perfect certainty’, ‘risk
without uncertainty’, ‘fully reducible uncertainty’, ‘partially reducible uncertainty’ and
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